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Chapter 4
The Gender Impact of Social Security Reform
in Latin America
Estelle James, Alejandra Cox Edwards, and Rebeca Wong

Over the past two decades many countries have adopted multipillar pension
systems that include both a public DB and a private DC pillar. Critics of
these pension reforms argue that the tight link between payroll contributions and benefits in the DC pillar will produce lower pensions for women.
In contrast, supporters of these reforms argue that multipillar systems
remove distortions that favored men and permit a more targeted public
pillar that will help women. This debate is important because the majority
of old people are women, pockets of poverty among the old are the largest
among very old women, and pension programs affect work incentives for
women.1
To test these conflicting claims, and to analyze more generally the gender
impact of alternative pension systems, this chapter examines the differential impact on genders of the new and old systems in three Latin-American
countries: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. In all three cases, the new social
security system includes two mandatory components: privately managed
funded individual accounts (DC) and a publicly managed and financed
safety net. On the basis of household survey data, we simulate the wage and
employment histories of representative men and women. These histories
are used to project and compare what their pensions would be under
Parts of this chapter have previously appeared as ‘The Gender Impact of Pension
Reform’ (2003b), The Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2(2):2003, www.pensionsjournal.com/articles/v2n2/. Reprinted by permission.
This chapter is part of a joint project carried out by James, Edwards, and Wong. It was
financed by the Economics and Gender Trust of the World Bank, for which we express our
appreciation. It is heavily based on an earlier version—James, Edwards, and Wong (2003b )—
but the tables are different. For earlier chapters coming out of this project, see Edwards
(2000a, 2000b , 2001a, 2001b , 2001c , 2002), Parker and Wong (2001), and Wong and Parker
(2001). For an earlier expanded version, see James, Edwards, and Wong (2003a). A much
expanded version is James, Edwards, and Wong (2008).
The authors wish to thank Gustavo de Marco, Rafael Rofman, Hermann von Gersdorff,
Augusto Iglesias, and David Madero Suarez for their helpful comments on earlier versions
and for answering our endless questions. We owe a special debt to Edward Whitehouse for
sharing with us his model for deriving actuarial factors used to convert accumulations to
annuity payouts.
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the new systems and what they would have been under the old system
rules, emphasizing the key design features that determine these gender
outcomes.

Why Do Pension Systems and Reforms Have a
Gender Impact?
In most public pension programs, workers receive benefits that depend on
wages and years of work or more directly on their contributions. These
contributory social security systems may have developed because pensions
were viewed as a replacement for wages and people are more willing to
pay the tax that finances the system if they receive a contingent monetary
benefit in return. However, women are likely to have worked and contributed fewer years than men have and earned lower wages when working,
which gives them a smaller pension. The labor market and demographic
differences between men and women that affect their pensions are well
known.
The labor market differences are:

r Labor force participation rates: Women, especially married women, traditionally have less continuous employment than do men due to the
division of labor within the family. They work roughly 50–70 percent
as many years as men in the three sample countries. In industrialized
countries the female labor force participation rate is still 10–30 percent
below that of men (Ginn, Street, and Arber 2001; OECD 2003). Even
when women work, their work is usually part-time, temporary, and
informal.
r Wage levels and age-earnings profiles: In Chile, Mexico, and Argentina,
younger women earn almost as much as men, after controlling for education. However, earnings diverge with age—prime age male earnings
rise 2–3 percent per year while female earnings rise 1–2 percent. This
may be due, at least in part, to the fact that the experience gap between
men and women increases with age. By age 50 women earn only 60–
70 percent as much as men, per month worked (James, Edwards,
and Wong 2003a). In countries like the UK, Canada, and Australia,
women’s hourly wage rates are 15–30 percent less than men’s, controlling for age and education (US GAO 1997; Ginn, Street, and Arber
2001).
r Different retirement ages: Social security rules in many countries allow
women to retire earlier than men. For example, in Chile and
Argentina, women are permitted to retire five years earlier than
men. These differential rules started in traditional DB systems and
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frequently continue in reformed systems—but the penalty for early
retirement is greater in a DC system.
The demographic differences are:

r Longevity: In most countries, women at age 60 have a life expectancy
that is 3–4 years greater than that of men. In Chile, a woman who
retires at age 60 can expect to live 7.5 years more than her husband
when he retires at age 65, on average. Thus retirement accumulation
yields lower annual pensions for women, especially if gender-specific
mortality tables are used for annuitization, as in Latin America. In
addition, women are more likely to grow very old, by which time they
have used up any voluntary savings and are therefore more likely to
live in poverty.
r Widowhood: Women tend to be younger than their husbands yet live
longer, so are likelier to become widows. (In the USA, 72% of women
aged 80–84 years are widows but only 27% of men are widowers.)
Hence survivor’s pensions are of key importance to women. Without
survivor’s benefits, widows who did not work in the labor market are
likely to find themselves impoverished. Even widows who have a pension of their own would find their household incomes cut by as much
as 70 percent without survivor’s benefits. Since household costs fall by
only 35 percent when the husband dies, due to household economies
of scale, widows find their income falls far more than their cost of
living. Survivor’s benefits fill in this gap.2
Given this background, we conjecture that recent reforms designed to link
benefits more closely with contributions will produce lower own-annuities
for women than for men. Partly to mitigate this effect, the new systems
in Latin America contain public DB or guarantees—usually financed by
general revenues—which are targeted toward low earners. We expect that
these public elements will generate transfer payments that favor women,
but detailed arrangements such as degree of targeting, years of work
required for eligibility, retirement age, and indexation provisions dictate
which women benefit and how much. The Latin-American reforms also
contain elaborate restrictions at the payout stage, especially regarding
annuitization, that redistribute pensions between the genders. We expect
that the common requirement of survivor’s benefits and joint annuities
will generate an important intrafamily redistribution toward women. We
measure the combined gender impact of own-annuities, public transfers,
and mandatory joint pensions on monthly and lifetime benefits and redistributions.
Finally, the new systems replaced PAYGO DB systems in which contributions and benefits were only loosely linked, and women must choose
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between receiving their own benefit or the widow’s benefit. The old systems
favored women in some ways but hurt them in others; thus, the net impact
of the change is uncertain a priori. We examine this question empirically.

Key Design Features of the Old and New Systems
With some important variations, described below, the Chilean system was
emulated in Mexico and Argentina, as well as in other Latin-American
countries that adopted multipillar systems. A brief discussion follows some
of the features of the new systems in Chile, Mexico, and Argentina that
affect gender outcomes. For more detailed descriptions of the pension
systems in these countries, refer to the chapters in this volume (Arenas de
Mesa et al. 2007; Rofman 2007; Sinha and de los Angeles Yañez 2007).
The new system in Chile requires a 10 percent payroll contribution to
individual accounts, plus an additional 2.5–3 percent to cover administrative costs and survivor’s and disability insurance (James et al. 2000; James,
Smalhout, and Vittas 2001; AIOS 2005).3 Upon retirement (age 65 for men,
60 for women), workers can make gradual withdrawals from their accounts
or buy an annuity that must be joint (60% to survivor) for married men.
(Lump sums are very restricted.)
A minimum pension guarantee (MPG) is given to those who have contributed at least twenty years. The MPG is currently about 25 percent of
the average wage, rising to 27 percent after age 70 and 29 percent after 75.
If the worker’s pension from private retirement saving does not reach the
MPG level, the government uses general revenues to top it up. The MPG
is formally indexed to prices and therefore retains a constant purchasing
power. However, so far the MPG has risen faster than prices, roughly at the
same pace as average wages, due to ad hoc political decisions. Because of
productivity growth, wages in Chile have risen 2 percent faster than prices.
De facto wage indexation of the MPG means that its purchasing power
increases with wage growth over time. In the simulations below we usually
assume price indexation but in some cases we show the striking difference
implied by wage indexation. While we cannot know what the future holds,
it will probably be somewhere between these two extremes.
In Argentina,4 workers contribute 11 percent of payroll, of which 2.5–
3.25 percent is deducted to cover administrative costs and survivor’s and
disability insurance fees; we use a net investment of 7.75 percent in our
simulations (James et al. 2000; James, Smalhout, and Vittas 2001; AIOS
2005).5 Upon retirement (age 65 for men, 60 for women), the accumulated
assets are taken out in the form of gradual withdrawals, annuities (joint
annuities with 70% to the survivor), or a lump sum for account balances
above the specified threshold. Instead of a Chilean-type MPG, Argentina
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provides a basic ‘flat’ benefit that is fixed in nominal terms. It was originally
financed by a payroll tax, but general revenues have now been partially
substituted. The full flat benefit is paid to all eligible workers, making it
much more expensive than the MPG top-up. To contain costs, eligibility
is restricted to workers with at least thirty years of contributions—which
excludes most women. Workers, mainly women, who reach age 70 with 10
years of contributions are granted a reduced flat pension that is 70 percent
of the full benefit. Widows also inherit 70 percent of their husband’s flat
benefit (the ‘widow’s flat’) when the spouse dies.
In Mexico, a contribution of 6.5 percent of payroll is made to individual
accounts. Administrative fees are 1.4–1.9 percent of wages; in our simulations we use a net of 4.6 percent (James et al. 2000; James, Smalhout, and
Vittas 2001; AIOS 2005). (Disability and survivor’s insurance are financed
by separate contribution.) Retirement income is further augmented by a
5 percent contribution of each worker’s wage to a housing fund, called
INFONAVIT (Instituto de Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores). If a worker does not borrow the money in the housing fund to
purchase a home, it becomes part of the worker’s retirement assets.6 During
the accumulations stage, workers can choose among competing investment
managers, as in Chile and Argentina. Upon retirement—at age 65 for both
genders—workers choose an annuity (joint with 60% to the survivor) or
gradual withdrawals spread over both spouses’ lifetimes.
The state helps finance this system in three ways. First, for each day
of work it pays a flat ‘social quota’ (SQ) to each account. The SQ was
initially equal to 5.5 percent of one daily minimum wage, which was then
2.2 percent of the average wage. Since it was supposed to be price-indexed,
this percentage will decline, as wages rise faster than prices over time.
The SQ is designed to increase the accounts of low-income workers and
their incentives to join the system. It is financed out of general revenues.
Second, workers are guaranteed a minimum pension, initially equal to the
minimum wage (40% of the average wage) indexed to inflation—provided
they contribute for a total of twenty-four years. Third, although the new
system is mandatory for new workers, those who were already in the labor
force when the reforms were made can opt back into the old system on
retirement. This study focuses on new workers who are not entitled to this
opt-back provision.

Methodology
Analysis of how women fare relative to men in the new and old social
security systems is made difficult by a number of factors. First, the new
systems have not been in place long enough to be mature. That is, current
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retirees in Chile and Argentina are subjected to a mixture of old and
new system benefits. We do not know what will be the benefit of someone
who is fully under the new system. In Mexico almost everyone has retired
under old-system rules, given the short period for accumulation and the
option that current workers have to revert to the old system on retirement.
Moreover, in all three countries we do not know the future rate of wage
growth and rate of return on investments, on which DC benefits depend.
Along similar lines, longitudinal data are not available. Thus, we could not
use actual employment histories of current retirees and workers to estimate
their retirement accumulations and entitlements.
We addressed these problems by constructing synthetic men and
women—using cross-sectional data on current behavior of people at different ages, educational levels, and marital status to proxy the lifetime
employment, wage, and contribution histories of ‘typical’ persons in each
category. We then simulated how the average man and woman in each
educational category would fare under the rules of the old and new systems,
given these histories. Five educational levels are presented, ranging from
incomplete primary to several years of postsecondary. The median group
has full secondary education in Chile, incomplete secondary education in
Argentina, and middle school education (nine years) in Mexico. We use
education as a proxy for ‘permanent income’.
This methodology assumes that age-specific labor force participation and
wage behavior will remain constant through time (except for secular wage
growth), separately for each educational level. In reality, female labor force
participation rates are strongly positively correlated with education, and
educational levels have been rising dramatically over time. This means
that aggregate female labor force participation rates will also rise over
time. Changing social norms are leading to additional increases in female
employment probabilities within each educational category. Moreover, the
work incentives and disincentives in the new pension systems may alter
work habits, so participation rates may be endogenous. To the degree
that rising labor force participation rates are due to increased education,
the numbers will remain constant within educational grouping even if the
aggregate numbers shift. Our analysis of the relationship between women’s
education and labor force participation rates over time indicates that onethird to one-half of the aggregate increase is due to changes in educational
composition of the population and the remainder is due to other factors
(James, Edwards, and Wong 2008).
These potential changes in age-specific female labor force participation
rates were not taken into account directly. However, in addition to the
‘average’ woman with average work experience in each educational group,
we also calculated pensions for ‘ten-year women’, women who worked only
ten years (prior to childbearing), and ‘full-career women’, women who
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had the same labor force participation and retirement age as men. Today’s
younger workers will probably look more like the full-career women when
they retire due to educational shifts and increased work propensities for
other reasons. The absence of longitudinal or retrospective data means that
we could not estimate wages as a function of experience, so the lifetime
earnings and pensions of full-career women are probably understated.
The representative men and women are assumed to be single until the
median age of marriage in each country and married thereafter. They
marry within their educational class, and the average husband is 3 years
older than the wife. The data are not adequate to model pensions of the
small proportion of women who remain single throughout their lifetimes.
However, the analysis of their work patterns indicates that singles work
50–100 percent more than married women. Thus, our simulations for fullcareer women may give us a rough approximation of the lifetime earnings
and benefits of single women.

Data
We seek to analyze the retirement incomes of women covered by the social
security system. (Many women do not work in the formal labor market and
hence are not covered by the formal social security system.) In constructing
our synthetic men and women, we used national household surveys for
urban areas for 1994 (Chile), 1996 (Argentina), and 1997 (Mexico).7 These
data do not coincide precisely with groups that are actually covered by
the social security system. While most social security affiliates live in urban
areas, some live in rural areas, and some urban residents are not covered
by social security. In Chile, the wage and work data primarily cover full-time
workers who contribute. The Chilean data allow us to identify social security
affiliates and the contributing behavior of affiliates. However, in Argentina
and Mexico the data cover full-time plus part-time workers, affiliates plus
nonaffiliates. Since many of these are not in the social security system,
our data may understate wages and work of women who were covered by
social security in these countries. Operating in the opposite direction, we
attributed all working time as contributing time, but we know that some
part of this work is outside the formal labor sector and social security
system, in which case our data would overestimate lifetime contributions,
annuities, and eligibility for the public benefit. While our object is to
characterize the behavior of men and women who are affiliated with social
security and contribute when they work, it is important to remember that
a substantial portion of individuals are not affiliated, and many do not
contribute much of their working time even if they are—the problem of
low density of contributions. We return to this problem later on.
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Simulations
In the following sections, we use these employment histories to simulate
the accumulations, annuities, and public benefit entitlements that different
groups of men and women can expect under the new systems. We simulate
the case of young workers, entering the labor market currently and retiring
40–45 years later. Accumulations and annuities under DC plans are very
sensitive to rates of return on investments and rates of wage growth. In
our baseline simulations, we assume a ‘moderate growth’ scenario in which
economywide real wage growth is 2 percent per year and the real rate
of return on investments, net of administrative fees, is 5 percent prior to
retirement. (The actual return has been much higher than this so far—
for example, it has averaged over 10% real in Chile since the start of the
system—but these high rates are unlikely to continue in the long run.)
The return during the payout stage is assumed to be 3.5 percent, given the
likelihood that many will choose a lower risk fixed-rate annuity (see James
and Song 2001; James and Vittas 2001).
Sensitivity analyses assuming a 3 percent real rate of return during the
accumulation stage, 1.5 percent during annuitization, and a 0 percent rate
of wage growth were also carried out. The gender differentials in this ‘slow
growth’ case were very similar to the baseline, except that the relative role
of the public benefit increases dramatically. The tables in this chapter show
only the baseline case. (For details on the slow growth case, see James,
Edwards, and Wong 2003a, 2003b, and 2008.) Severe portfolio restrictions
in Latin America ensure that rates of return will be similar for all workers.
If yields were lower for women because they tend to choose a risk-averse
portfolio, this would lead to a lower gender ratio.8 Finally, throughout
this analysis we abstract from inflation. As is discussed briefly below, this
probably leads us to understate the gender improvement from the new
system.
Although both gradual withdrawals and annuities are permitted at the
payout stage, to impute a stable annual flow for purposes of this analysis
we assume that these accumulations are fully annuitized on retirement.
We derive the annuity payouts by dividing the projected accumulation
by relevant annuity factors, which depend on the interest and mortality
rates. We use World Bank mortality tables that include expected longevity
improvement factors for the cohort retiring in 2040, which is the approximate year when young workers today will retire. Gender-specific tables are
used by insurance companies in the three countries and by our analysis.
These data do not allow us to differentiate longevity by educational or
income level, which leads us to overestimate lifetime system progressivity.
Men and women are assumed to retire at the age that is specified in
each country. In reality, we know that early retirement is common for
both genders, which will reduce the size of pension though not necessarily
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the gender differential. While we start by comparing monthly benefits, to
analyze transfers from different sources we shift to a comparison of lifetime
benefits, since retirement age and expected age of death vary by gender
and country and benefits from the joint annuity start flowing to widows in
very old age.9

The Old System Counterfactual
We start out by analyzing only the new systems, then move on to compare the gender impact of the new and the old systems. This approach
introduces an additional set of methodological problems. The old systems
were actuarially unbalanced and so could not have delivered their promised
benefits. In the long run, all these countries faced the prospect of raising
taxes (which were difficult to collect) and/or reneging on their pension
promises. Chile was facing financial insolvency even in the short term,
and Argentina was already defaulting on payments to retirees. Given this
uncertainty regarding benefit payments in the old system, what is the counterfactual to the new system?
We avoid this problem by applying the DB formulas in place just before
the reform and by focusing on relative positions rather than absolute gains
and losses to different gender-education-marital groups. We thus abstract
from efficiency effects that might lead everyone to be better or worse off.
We ask: which groups gained or lost the most in relative terms from the
reform? Did gender ratios improve or deteriorate? Implicitly, this means
our counterfactual is any system in which the fiscal adjustment to the preexisting insolvency is distributionally neutral—involving equiproportional
benefit cuts or tax increases for each group. We compare the new system
with this counterfactual.

Retirement Income for Women versus Men in the
New System
Using the methodology just described, we estimate the monthly and lifetime benefits representative women and men would receive from private
annuities, public benefits, and intrahousehold transfers. All monetary values have been converted to 2002 US dollars. (For Argentina, this exchange
rate was about one-third of the rate that obtained during our study period
prior to the country’s fiscal crisis.)

Income from Women’s Own-Annuities
To simplify, we assume here that all workers retire at the legal retirement
age: 60 for women in Chile and Argentina, 65 for women in Mexico,
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and 65 for men in all three countries. Women with ‘average’ employment
experience receive annuities that are only 30–50 percent those of men with
similar education because of their lower lifetime work and wages and earlier
retirement. The lower benefits for women are partly because of their earlier
allowable retirement age in Chile and Argentina. Few women postpone
taking their pension beyond age 60, possibly because they do not realize
the large difference in the pension amount that would accrue. If women
in Chile and Argentina delayed pensioning until age 65, they would collect
interest for 5 more years and their annuities would cover 5 fewer years.
Tables 4-1a and 4-1b and Figures 4-1a, 4-1b, and 4-1c show that their accumulations would increase by 25–30 percent and their monthly pensions by
almost 50 percent, and the gender ratio would narrow substantially. The
increase would be even larger if they worked and contributed during this
period. The equal retirement ages for men and women in Mexico is the
main reason why female/male ratios of annuities are projected to be higher
than in Argentina and almost as high as in Chile, despite the relatively lower
wages and work histories of Mexican women.
The monthly annuities of ‘full-career women’, who work as much as men,
are higher than those of average women but only 60–75 percent as large
as those of men. The remaining difference is due to the lower wage that
women have received and the smaller contributions they have therefore
made.
Table 4-1a Simulated Future Monthly Annuities from Individual Accounts
(Based on 5% Real Return in Accumulation Stage, 3.5% in Annuity
Stage, 2% Real Wage Growth, Data in 2002 US$)
Chile
Incomplete
Primary

Incomplete
Secondary

Complete
Secondary

Up to 4 Post
Secondary

5+ yrs PostSecondary

$179

$259

$386

$538

$1,240

$59

$83

$146

$241

$444

88

121

213

351

661

136

183

297

408

702

36

42

55

87

140

Average married males, RA = 65
Annuity
Females
Average women,
RA = 60
Average woman
if RA = 65
Full-career
woman,
RA = 65
10-year woman,
RA = 60

(cont.)
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Table 4-1a (Continued)
Argentina
Incomplete
Primary
Average married males, RAa = 65
Annuity
$153
Females
Average woman,
$32
RA = 60
Average woman
47
if RA = 65
101
FC,b RA = 65
22
10-year,c RA = 60

Incomplete
Secondary

Complete
Secondary

Some PostSecondary

University
Degree

$233

$349

$362

$701

$46

$91

$127

$248

67

132

185

360

140
33

228
42

238
52

414
87

Mexico
0–5
Average married males, RA = 65
Annuity
$267
Females, RA = 65
Average woman
$78
FC woman
162
10-year woman
47

6–8

9

10–12

13+

$310

$381

$481

$822

$93
201
51

$123
247
61

$199
362
86

$407
558
125

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology. WB gender-specific mortality tables for cohort retiring
in 2040 are used to generate actuarial factors for annuity pricing.
Notes: Joint annuity payouts are given for married men and women in Argentina and
Mexico, individual annuities for women in Chile, as required by law. Wives are assumed
to be three years younger than their husbands. World Bank gender-specific mortality tables
for each country for cohorts retiring in 2040 are used to generate actuarial factors. Wives
have three to four years greater longevity than their husbands. MPG in Chile, flat benefit
in Argentina, and annuity from the social quota (SQ) in Mexico are not included in this
table.
a RA: Retirement age.
b FC:

Full-career woman with same labor force participation rate as men.
woman: Works for ten years, prior to having children.

c 10-year

Women with higher education have higher labor force participation rates
than do others, making them more like full-career women. However, they
continue to be adversely affected by their lower retirement age, and the
wage gap tends to increase for women with the highest education. As a
result, female/male pension ratios increase with educational level, until the
top level, when they typically fall.
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Table 4-1b Female/Male Ratio of Simulated Monthly Annuities from
Individual Accounts (in Percentages) (Based on 5% Real Return in
Accumulation Stage, 3.5% in Annuity Stage, 2% Real Wage Growth,
Data in 2002 US$)
Chile
Incomplete
Primary
Average married males, RA = 65
Annuity
100
Females
Average women,
33
RA = 60
Average woman
49
if RA = 65
Full-career
76
woman,
RA = 65
10-year woman,
20
RA = 60

Incomplete
Secondary

Complete
Secondary

Up to 4
post-Secondary

5+ years PostSecondary

100

100

100

100

32

38

45

36

47

55

65

53

71

77

76

57

16

14

16

11

Incomplete
Secondary

Complete
Secondary

Some PostSecondary

University
Degree

100

100

100

100

20

26

35

35

29

38

51

51

60
14

65
12

66
14

59
12

6–8

9

10–12

13+

100

100

100

100

30
65
17

32
65
16

41
75
18

49
68
15

Argentina
Incomplete
Primary
Average married males, RA = 65
Annuity
100
Females
Average woman,
21
RA = 60
Average woman
31
if RA = 65
FC, RA = 65
66
10-year, RA = 60
14

Mexico
0–5
Average married males, RA = 65
Annuity
100
Females, RA = 65
Average woman
29
FC woman
61
10-year woman
18

Source: Calculations by authors. See Table 4-1a for definitions and methodology.
Notes: The female/male ratio is the ratio of annuities of female to male in the same
educational and marital categories.
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Female/male ratios of accumulated funds at retirement, Chile
80%
70%
Full career-65
Av. w.-65
Av. w.-60
10-yr. w.-60

60%

F/M ratios

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1

4
3
2
Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

5

Figure 4-1a. More work and postponed retirement increase female/male ratios of
accumulations (Chile).

Income from the Public Benefit
As discussed above, the MPG in Chile, the flat benefit and widow’s flat
benefit in Argentina, and the SQ in Mexico provide a public benefit that
goes disproportionately to low earners. These public benefits raise the total
pension of low earners by a much higher percentage than that of high
earners, which also means they raise the pensions of women proportionately more than men (Table 4-2). However, the precise effect on women
depends on the design of the benefit.
In Chile, if the MPG is price-indexed (as it is formally), it raises the total
monthly pension of the average woman who has not completed primary
school by 31 percent (Figure 4-2a). Average women in higher educational
categories do not receive this benefit, nor do full-career women, because
their own-annuity is projected to be above the MPG floor. (For the same
reason very few men are projected to receive the public benefit.) Its impact
is quite small because a price-indexed MPG that is 25 percent of the average
wage today will be only 12 percent by the time today’s young workers retire.
Because the MPG is currently about double the official poverty line, it will
keep all eligible women out of poverty—but it will not help any except the
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Female/male ratios of accumulated funds, Argentina
70%

60%
Full career-65
Av. w.-65
Av. w.-60
10-yr. w.-60

F/M ratios

50%
40%

30%
20%

10%
0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary+)

Figure 4-1b. More work and postponed retirement increase female/male ratios of
accumulations (Argentina).

lowest earners, it becomes less relevant as it falls further behind the average
wage in the economy, and it costs very little.
On the other hand, if the MPG is wage-indexed (as it has been de
facto, by political decisions), the story is quite different. With expected
wage growth of 2 percent yearly, the MPG will more than double over the
working life of today’s young worker. Because it grows at the same rate as
wages, it remains at 25–29 percent of the average wage. In this scenario,
most women (even some full-career women and some men) are likely to
receive some MPG top-up. For women with average work histories in the
bottom educational category, a wage-linked MPG will almost triple their
own-annuities and bring their total retirement income very close to that of
their male counterparts. Of course, this increased size of and access to the
MPG raises its fiscal cost substantially. Thus the choice between wage- and
price-indexation is crucial, as it determines its costs and benefits and how
these change for future cohorts. In the discussion below we assume priceindexation, unless wage-indexation is explicitly mentioned. Doing so biases
our results against women, whose relative position will improve if the wage
linkage continues.
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Female/male ratios of accumulated funds at retirement, Mexico
80%
70%
60%
FC w-65
Av w-65
10 yr w-65

F/M ratios
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Figure 4-1c. More work increases female/male ratios of accumulations (Mexico).

Whether it is price- or wage-indexed, the MPG does not provide income
to high earners. (In this sense, it is more narrowly targeted toward low
earners and women than is Argentina’s flat benefit or Mexico’s SQ.) If it
is price-indexed, it narrows the gender gap at the bottom but does nothing
at the top or in the middle.
Twenty years of contributions are required to be eligible for the MPG.
Although some women do not meet this criterion,10 the average woman
in all educational categories does. Moreover, low-earning women will be
encouraged by the MPG to work twenty years even if they did not plan
to do so otherwise—but they are discouraged from working marginally
more than twenty years because if their own-annuity increases, their public
benefit will decrease commensurately. Likewise, low-earning women are
unlikely to work past the normal retirement age, once they meet the twentyyear requirement. The incentive for strategic manipulation is greater if
the MPG is wage-indexed. An MPG that rises for each year of work would
prevent some of these moral hazard problems.
In Argentina, by contrast, most men who contribute when they work are
eligible for the flat public benefit and receive it regardless of income.11
Although most women work fewer than the 30 years required for full

17:39

04-Kay-and-Sinha-c04

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

(Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 103 of 133

August 20, 2007

4 / The Gender Impact of Social Security Reform 103
Table 4-2 Projected Impact of Public Benefits on Monthly Pensions (2002 US$)
Education
Chile
Married Men
Annuity, RA = 65
% increase-MPG
Women with average work histories
Annuity, RA = 60
Annuity + MPG if price-indexed
Annuity + MPG if wage-indexed
% incr.-MPG price-indexed
% incr.-MPG wage-indexed
Average female/male ratios (%)
Own-annuity
Annuity + MPG if price-indexed
–if wage-indexed
Argentina
Married men
Annuity, RA = 65
Annuity + flat
% increase by flat
Women with average work histories
Annuity, RA = 60
Annuity + flat
% incr. by flat
Average female/male ratios (%)
Own-annuity
Own + flat (at 65)
Own + flat (at 70)
Mexico
Married men
Own-annuity, no SQ
Annuity incl. SQ
% increase by SQ
Women with average work histories
Own-annuity, no SQ
Annuity incl. SQ
% incr. by SQ
Average female/male ratios
Annuity if no SQ (%)
Annuity incl. SQ (%)

1

2

3

4

5

$179
0

$259
0

$386
0

$538
0

$1, 240
0

$59
$78
$172
31
192

$83
$83
$172
0
107

$146
$146
$172
0
18

$241
$241
$241
0
0

$444
$444
$444
0
0

33
44
96

32
32
66

38
38
45

45
45
45

36
36
36

$153
$230
50

$233
$310
33

$349
426
22

$362
439
21

$701
778
11

$32
$86
169

$46
$100
118

$91
$145
60

$127
$181
43

$248
$325
31

21
14
37

20
15
32

26
21
34

35
29
41

35
42
42

$267
$364
36

$310
$407
31

$381
$478
25

$481
$573
19

$822
$909
11

$78
126
62

$93
141
52

$123
177
44

$199
260
30

$407
477
17

29
35

30
35

32
37

41
45

49
53

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology.
Notes: See Table 4-1a for definition of the five education categories and other notes. The
MPG is converted to actuarially equivalent monthly top-up. In Argentina average women in
the bottom four educational groups receive a reduced flat benefit at age 70 while in the top
education group, they work enough to receive the full flat at age 65, and the flat benefit is
treated as if it is price-indexed (although it is not). SQ = social quota.
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Average female/male ratios of annuity+MPG, Chile
120%
Annuity+MPG (wage-indexed)
Annuity+MPG (price-indexed)
Own-annuity

100%

F/M ratios

80%

60%

40%

20%
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4

5

Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

Figure 4-2a. Wage-indexed MPG: larger and broader impact than price-indexed
MPG (Chile).

eligibility, they get a reduced flat benefit beginning at age 70 if they have
worked 10 years. This situation exemplifies the importance of eligibility
conditions in determining the gender impact. Even though the reduced
flat benefit for women is a smaller absolute amount than it is for men, it is a
much larger increment to women’s own-annuity, and more than doubles
the pensions of women with primary and partial secondary education.
Women with a university degree and full-career women work long enough
to get the full flat benefit at age 65 (see Figure 4-2b). Additionally, married
women inherit 70 percent of their husbands’ flat benefit.
Because the flat and widow’s flat benefit are partially financed by a tax on
wages, the fact that men earn more than women but get a smaller benefit
compared with their wages means that women get a positive net transfer.
The largest net transfer goes to women who work only ten years. (For
further discussion of imputed taxes and net benefits, see James, Edwards,
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Female/male ratios of annuities plus flat benefit, Argentina
FC: annuity+flat(65)
FC: own-annuities(65)
Av.: annuity+flat(70)

90%

Av.: own-annuity(F60,M65))
10-yr.: annuity+flat(70)
10-yr.: annuity only(F60,M65)

80%
70%

F/M ratios

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary)

Figure 4-2b. Large % increment to 10-year women and low earners from flat benefit
in Argentina.

and Wong 2003a, 2003b, and 2008.) This large benefit for ten-year women
makes the Argentine public benefit much like a noncontributory scheme.
On the one hand, this transfer provides retirement income to older women
who otherwise would have few resources of their own and keeps them
out of poverty. On the other hand, it also goes to middle-class women
who are far from the poverty line. Moreover, the benefit may discourage
market work among women and in the long run make them less financially
independent.
Finally, Mexico’s SQ adds a flat amount to every worker’s account for
each day worked: 5.5 percent of the minimum wage. While the public
benefits in Chile and Argentina are financed on a PAYGO basis, which may
imply a large hidden liability for government, Mexico’s SQ is prefunded,
paid into workers’ accounts long before they retire, and invested by the
worker with his or her own contributions.
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Female/male ratios of annuities with and without SQ, Mexico
0.9

FC: ann.incl. SQ
FC: ann., no SQ
Av.: ann. incl. SQ

0.8

Av.: ann., no SQ
10yr.: ann. incl. SQ
10yr.: ann., no SQ

0.7

M/F ratios

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1
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3

4

5

6

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary)

Figure 4-2c. Larger impact of SQ for low earners who work more in Mexico.

The daily size of the SQ is uniform, so the percentage increment to
pensions falls for high earners, as in Chile and Argentina. It adds 45–
60 percent to the annuities of women with primary or partial secondary
education but only 25–35 percent to counterpart men. Women with some
university education get a larger total SQ (because they work more) but a
smaller percentage increment to their own pensions (Figure 4-2c). Because
Mexico’s SQ gives an extra benefit for every day of work, it is less tilted
toward women than is Argentina’s flat benefit, but it encourages work by
women more than do Chile’s and Argentina’s public benefits.
Mexico also offers an MPG for those with twenty-four years of contributions. Initially the MPG was 40 percent of the average wage—a relatively
high minimum. However, because it is price-indexed, it will fall to less than
20 percent by the time today’s young workers retire. Since most low-earning
women work in the formal sector fewer than twenty-four years, and most
men will have own-annuities that exceed the MPG floor, our projections
indicate that it will have little impact—if it remains price-indexed. The
choice between a twenty-year eligibility rule as in Chile and a twenty-four-

17:39

04-Kay-and-Sinha-c04

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

(Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 107 of 133

August 20, 2007

4 / The Gender Impact of Social Security Reform 107

year rule as in Mexico turns out to be crucial for women, given their current
labor force behavior.

Income from Joint Annuities
The gender gap in retirement income from women’s own-annuities is
offset further by joint annuities (or widow’s benefits) that husbands are
required to provide for their surviving wives. In Chile and Mexico, the
widow gets 60 percent of the husband’s annuity amount; in Argentina, 70
percent. The husband pays for this by getting a smaller payout initially.
These intrahousehold transfers are an important part of the new systems.
They can be viewed as a formalization of the informal family contract, in
which men agree to provide monetary support to their wives in return for
nonmonetary household services and partial withdrawal from the labor
market. Some men may be myopic and fail to arrange for continuing to
support their wives after their deaths (Bernheim et al. 2001). The joint
annuity requirement is a way to enforce this contract. When the wife is 3
years younger than her husband, joint annuities pay him 17–21 percent
less per month than individual annuities, while doubling or tripling the
monthly pension that the average widow will receive (see Table 4-3).
The joint annuity is especially important because a widow’s cost of living is estimated to be roughly 70 percent that of a couple’s cost due to
household economies of scale. The widow’s benefit plus her own benefit
maintains her purchasing power at 70–80 percent of the previous household level, so her standard of living is unchanged when her husband dies.
The joint annuity requirement also applies to unmarried mothers of the
worker’s children. It protects women who did not work at all in the formal
market and augments the income of those who did. It does not, of course,
protect single, unattached women.
Additionally, since her husband rather than the public treasury has paid
for the joint annuity, the widow can keep her own annuity when she gets the
survivor’s benefit, in contrast to the previous systems in Chile, Argentina,
and many other countries. Since women got little or no benefit from their
own contributions, their participation in the labor market was penalized
and discouraged in many old DB systems. Under the new systems, the
treatment of the joint annuity encourages work.
It is also worth noting that, with joint annuities, pensions are similar whether gender-specific or unisex mortality tables are used (James,
Edwards, and Wong 2003b, 2008). Regarding the purchase of individual
annuities, unisex mortality tables produce 7–9 percent higher payouts for
women and lower payouts for men compared to gender-specific tables, but
with joint annuities this choice of mortality tables makes little difference
because joint annuity pricing takes into account the combined lifetimes
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Table 4-3 The Impact of Joint Annuities (r = 5% during Accumulations, 3.5%
during Annuity Stage, Real Wage Growth = 2%, 2002 US$)
Education
Chile
Males, retiring at 65
Individual
Joint
Females, retiring at 60
Individual
Widow’s benefit
Widow’s pensions as % of H + W pensions
Argentina
Males, retiring at 65
Individual
Joint
Females, retiring at 60
Individual
Joint
Widow’s benefit
Widow’s pensions as % of H + W pensions
Mexico
Males retiring at 65
Individual
Joint
Females retiring at 65
Individual
Joint
Widow’s benefit
Widow’s pensions as % of H + W pensions

1

2

3

4

5

$217
179

$314
259

$467
386

$651
538

$1,501
1,240

$59
107
70

$83
156
70

$146
232
71

$241
323
72

$444
744
71

$194
153

$296
233

$443
349

$459
362

$889
701

$34
32
107
78

$48
46
163
77

$96
91
244
78

$134
127
253
79

$261
248
491
79

$448
364

$501
407

$589
478

$705
573

$1,120
909

$133
126
218
70

$148
141
244
70

$187
177
287
71

$273
260
344
72

$502
477
545
74

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology.
Notes: See Table 4-1a for educational categories. The MPG and flat benefit are not included
in this table. SQ is included, since it is part of annuity. In Chile husbands must purchase joint
annuities and wives purchase individual annuities. In Argentina and Mexico, both spouses
must purchase joint annuities. Joint annuity assumes 60% to survivor (70% in Argentina).
Husbands and wives are assumed to belong to same educational group. The last row for
each country gives full public + private pensions of wife after husband dies relative to total
pensions of husband + wife while husband was alive. H + W pensions means total pensions of
husband + wife.

of husband and wife. In this way, the joint annuity requirement defuses
the sometimes controversial issue of whether to require unisex tables. This
applies only to married couples or registered partners; the issue remains
important for single men and women.
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Total Lifetime Pension from Own-Annuity, Public Benefit, and
Joint Annuity
The discussion now shifts to total lifetime rather than monthly benefits
because the widow’s benefit and Argentina’s reduced flat benefit start at a
much later age than benefits based on own earnings. Moreover, the retirement age for women in Chile and Argentina is earlier than that for men
and for Mexican women (the normal retirement age sometimes changed
as part of the reform). To compare benefits across subgroups, countries,
and time, therefore, it is necessary to calculate their expected present
value, taking into account life expectancy and age when the benefit starts.
Expected present value of lifetime benefits is measured as of age 65 using
a 3.5 percent discount rate (the rate of return on annuities) and World
Bank gender-specific mortality tables for each country. In general, lifetime
gender ratios are higher than monthly ratios because women live longer
than men and, in Chile and Argentina, retire earlier. Also, in general,
lifetime gender ratios are higher for low educational categories because
of the equalizing effect of the public benefit and the relatively greater
compound interest earned by workers with flat age-earnings profiles.
The addition of the public benefit and joint annuity bring the present
value of lifetime benefits for women much closer to that of men than does
the own-annuity alone. Among women with an average work history, the
public benefit adds 20–80 percent to lifetime income stemming from their
own-annuity, and the joint annuity adds another 40–100 percent (Figures
4-3 and 4-4 and Table 4-4). The joint annuity more than doubles lifetime
retirement income for ten-year women who did little market work. In
general, the joint annuity is larger than the public benefit.
Taking into account all 3 income sources, the lifetime retirement income
of the average married woman is 65–95 percent that of average men with
similar education (even higher in Chile if it continues to wage-link its
MPG). This ratio becomes 100 percent or more for full-career married
women—working longer and retiring later has the largest impact of all.
Of course, single women do not get the joint annuity. Therefore, their
female/male ratios are much lower (Tables 4-4 and 4-5, Figures 4-5a, 4-5b,
and 4-5c).
While these generalizations hold for all three countries, formal labor
force attachment is rewarded differentially in each case. The own-annuity
rises with incremental work in each country. However, very different patterns apply to the public benefit. In Chile, only average women in the
lowest educational groups, who retire early with about twenty years’ experience, will get a public benefit. Neither ten-year women, full-career women,
women who postpone retirement, nor highly educated women who work
more get the MPG. In Mexico, by contrast, full-career women get the largest
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% increment to EPV from public benefit: men vs women, high vs low earners
90%
Argentina−woman
Mexico−woman
Mexico−man
Argentina−man
Chile−woman
Chile−man

80%

% increase from public benefit
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Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

Figure 4-3. Women and low earners get largest % increment to EPV from public
benefit. Note: EPV = expected present value.

public benefits, ten-year women the smallest. In Argentina, a substantial
benefit and net subsidy go to women who work only ten years. A high
implicit tax rate must be imposed on high-earning men and full-career
women to finance these benefits. Even without taking account of these
taxes, the ratio of benefits received by a full-career or an average woman
relative to a ten-year woman is much higher in Mexico than in Argentina.
The lower payoff in Argentina may discourage women from market work.
In contrast, for Chile the minimal size of the public benefit means that the
higher work incentive of the private annuity dominates (Figure 4-6).

Women’s Benefits Relative to Men Before
and After Reform
Because of uncertainty regarding future benefit levels under the old insolvent systems, we cannot compare the absolute dollar values of the benefits
women would have received under the old systems to those under the new.

17:39

04-Kay-and-Sinha-c04

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

(Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 111 of 133

August 20, 2007

4 / The Gender Impact of Social Security Reform 111
EPV of own-annuity, public benefit and joint annuity−married women, secondary education
40
35

Own
Public
Joint

2002 US$ 000’s

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Argentina

Mexico

Chile

EPV by source for Argentina, Chile, and Mexico

Figure 4-4. Joint annuity adds more than public benefit to EPV of average woman.
Note: EPV = expected present value.

However, we can compare the female/male ratios of benefits before and
after reform, under the assumption that the counterfactual would have had
the same distributional effects as the original system (see the section on
methodology above). We therefore ask: (a) Did the gender gap in pensions
get larger or smaller in the process of the reform?, and (b) which subgroups
of women (and men) gained or lost the most? We find that, in general, the
gender ratio is projected to improve because of the reform, and the greatest
relative gains will be received by low-earning married women (and single
men). Full-career women gained more than did ten-year women in Chile
and Mexico, consistent with their emphasis on work incentives, but ten-year
women gained more in Argentina (Figures 4-7a, 4-7b, and 4-7c).

A Priori Expectations about the New versus the Old Systems
The old systems provided DB according to a formula that depended on
wages and years of contributions. In general, the formula gave generous
benefits to workers who contributed for only ten years and then withdrew
from the labor market; these workers were disproportionately women.12
Married women got a widow’s benefit that was 50 percent of their husband’s
pension in Chile, 75 percent in Argentina, and 90 percent in Mexico.
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Table 4-4 Present Value of Lifetime Annuity, Joint Annuity, and Public Benefit
(r = 5% during Accumulation, 3.5% Discount Rate after Retirement,
Real Wage Growth = 2%; in 2002 US$ (1,000s))
Education
Chile
Average man
Individual annuity
Cost of joint annuity (if married)
Average woman
Own-annuity
MPG (if price-indexed)
MPG (if wage-indexed)
Joint annuity received (if
married)
% incr. from MPG
(price-indexed)
% incr. from MPG
(wage-indexed)
% incr. from joint annuity
Full-career woman
Own-annuity
% incr. from joint annuity
10-year woman
Own-annuity
% incr. from joint annuity
Argentina
Average man
Individual annuity
Flat
Cost of joint annuity (if married)
% incr. from flat
Average woman
Own-annuity
Flat
Widow’s flat
Joint annuity received (if
married)
% incr. from flat
% incr. from widow’s flat
% incr. from joint annuity
FC woman
Own annuity
Flat
% incr. from flat

1

2

3

4

5

$32.4
−5.6

$46.9
−8.2

$69.9
−12.2

$97.4
−16.9

$224.4
−39.0

$13.9
3.1
18.5
6.3

$19.4
0
14.6
9.1

$34.3
0
4.3
13.5

$56.5
0
0
18.8

$104.0
0
0
43.3

22

0

0

0

0

133

75

13

0

0

45

47

39

33

42

$23.6
27

$31.8
28

$51.5
26

$70.8
27

$121.7
36

$8.3
75

$9.9
92

$12.9
105

$20.5
92

$32.8
132

$27.7
11.0
−5.8
40

$42.2
11.0
−8.9
26

$63.2
11.0
−13.3
17

$65.5
11.0
−13.8
17

$126.9
11.0
−26.7
9

$7.7
6.1
3.3
6.5

$11.0
6.1
3.3
9.9

$21.9
6.1
3.3
14.8

$30.5
6.1
3.3
15.3

$59.7
17.6
3.3
29.6

79
42
84

55
29
89

28
15
68

20
11
50

29
5
50

$18.2
13.0
71

$25.1
13.0
52

$40.9
13.0
32

$42.8
13.0
30

$74.4
13.0
17

August 20, 2007
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Table 4-4 (Continued)
Education
% incr. from widow’s flat
% incr. from joint annuity
10-year woman
Own-annuity
Flat
% incr. from flat
% incr. from widow’s flat
% incr. From joint ann.
Mexico
Average man
Individual annuity, no SQ
SQ
Cost of joint annuity (if married)
% increase from SQ
Average woman
Own-annuity if no SQ
SQ to own-account
Joint annuity (if married)
% incr. from SQ
% incr. from joint annuity
Full-career woman
Own-annuity if no SQ
SQ
% incr. from SQ
% incr. from joint annuity
10-year woman
Own-annuity if no SQ
SQ
% incr. from SQ
% incr. from joint annuity
Rewards for work in 3 countries:
Benefits to full-career/10-year
woman
Public benefit + own-annuity
(percentage)
Chile
Argentina
Mexico
Public benefit (percentage)
Chilea
Argentina
Mexico

1

2

3

4

5

18
36

13
39

8
36

8
36

4
40

$5.3
6.1
120
64
128

$8.0
6.1
81
43
131

$10.2
6.1
63
34
153

$12.5
6.1
51
28
130

$21.0
6.1
31
16
149

$46.2
16.8
−11.9
36

$53.7
16.8
−13.3
31

$66.1
16.7
−15.6
25

$83.3
16.0
−18.7
19

$142.5
15.0
−29.7
11

$13.6
8.5
13.2
62
97

$16.2
8.5
14.7
52
91

$21.5
9.5
17.3
44
80

$34.8
10.6
20.7
30
60

$71.1
12.3
32.9
17
46

$28.3
16.8
59
46

$35.2
16.8
48
42

$43.1
16.7
39
40

$63.3
16.0
25
33

$97.5
15.0
15
34

$8.2
6.1
74
160

$9
6.0
67
164

$10.7
6.0
56
162

$15.1
6.1
41
137

$21.8
6.1
28
151

283
231
315

322
236
346

401
287
357

346
267
374

371
294
403

174
275

174
278

174
277

174
262

174
245
(cont.)
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Table 4-4 (Continued)
Education
Public benefit: Average/10-year
woman (percentage)
Chilea
Argentina
Mexico

1

2

3

4

5

100
140

100
140

100
158

100
173

223
202

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology.
Notes: For educational categories see Table 4-1a. Married full-career and 10-year women get
the same joint annuity and other widow’s benefits as do average women, but these benefits
constitute different percentages of their own-annuity.
a

Full-career and 10-year women in Chile do not get any public benefit. Only the woman
with an average work history in the lowest wage category gets a public benefit, if it is priceindexed. A larger group gets it if it is wage-indexed.

Female/male ratios: EPV of lifetime benefits by subgroup, Chile
120%

100%

F/M ratios

80%

60%

40%
FC: married
FC: single
Average: married
Average: annuity+MPG
Average: annuity

20%

0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

Figure 4-5a. EPV of full-career married women exceeds that of men in Chile.
Note: EPV = expected present value.
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Female/male ratios of lifetime benefits, by subgroup, Argentina
FC: married
FC: single
Av.: married
Average: single
Average: own annuity

140%

120%

F/M ratios of EPV

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary)

Figure 4-5b. EPV of full-career married women exceeds that of men in Argentina.
Note: EPV = expected present value.

Implicitly, unisex tables were used. Women could retire five years earlier
than men with no actuarial penalty in Chile and Argentina. In all three
countries, a minimum pension protected low-earning women who satisfied
the eligibility requirements.
Contrary to these provisions that favored women, the old systems based
their benefits on the wage earned during the last few working years, which
favored men. Because of inflation and real wage growth, a woman who
worked at ages 20–30, before childbearing, would find her pension based
on wages that would appear to be very low compared with prevailing wages
at her retirement at ages 60–65. Moreover, this formula for the pensionable
wage base favored workers with steep age–earnings profiles, who tended
to be highly educated men. By contrast, in the new system contributions
made in early adulthood add more to present value of lifetime benefits
than contributions made in the final years because of compound interest
that far exceeds the growth rate of prices or wages.
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Female/male ratios of lifetime benefits, by subgroup, Mexico
FC: married
FC: single
Av.: married
Av: single
Av.: ann. no SQ

140%

120%

F/M ratios

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary)

Figure 4-5c. EPV of full-career married women exceeds that of men in Mexico.
Note: EPV = expected present value.

In the old systems in Chile and Argentina, women usually had to give up
their own pension to get the widow’s pension, so women who worked much
of their lives in the labor market got little or no incremental benefit. In the
new systems, women keep their own benefit as well as the requisite joint
annuity. Further, as we have seen, the new public benefits are tilted toward
low earners, who are predominantly women. Thus there are pushes and
pulls in both directions a priori, so the impact of the reforms on gender
ratios is an empirical question, which we shall explore.
It is also worth noting that pensions in the old system often were not
indexed for inflation, yet inflation was high in these countries, devaluing
the benefit. This especially hurt women, who live longer and therefore
experience greater price increases. In contrast, annuities in the new system
in Chile are price-indexed; Mexico plans to index them also. Public benefits
in these countries are also indexed for inflation or higher. We abstract
from inflation because of its uneven nature and the unpredictable ad hoc
responses that were made by the old systems, which biases our results
against the new systems.13
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Table 4-5 Female/Male Ratios of Expected Present Value of Lifetime Benefits
in New vs Old Systems (in Percentages)
Education
Chile
Old system
Av.: own pension
Av.: own + widow’s
FC: own pension
FC: own + widow’s
10 yr: own + widow’s
New system
Av.: own-annuity
Av.: own + MPG
Av.: own + MPG + joint
FC: own-annuity
FC: own + joint
10 yr: own + joint
Argentina
Old system
Av.: own pension
Av.: own + widow’s
FC: own pension
FC: own + widow’s
10 yr: own + widow’s
New system
Average woman: own-annuity
Average woman: own + flat
Average woman: own + flat + joint
FC: own + flat
FC: own + flat + joint
10 yr: own + flat + joint
Mexico
Old system
Average woman: own pension
Average woman: own + widow’s
FC: own pension
FC: own + widow’s
10 yr: own + widow’s
New system
Average woman: own annuity
Average woman: own incl. SQ
Average woman: own + SQ + joint
FC: own incl. SQ
FC: own + SQ + joint
10-year: own + SQ + joint

1

2

3

4

5

78
78
82
82
78

63
67
72
72
58

100
100
94
94
54

99
99
68
68
60

75
76
70
70
45

52
64
87
88
112
55

50
50
73
82
105
49

59
59
83
89
113
46

70
70
94
88
111
49

56
56
79
66
89
41

21
40
76
80
40

13
30
50
57
30

33
47
48
55
27

55
64
68
69
31

60
68
62
65
30

33
41
70
92
120
63

31
37
66
82
111
60

42
44
72
84
112
55

56
56
84
85
112
57

57
67
94
75
102
52

39
77
70
108
69

33
71
60
99
57

29
68
63
102
52

33
72
73
112
46

59
97
91
130
44

26
42
66
86
107
51

28
42
65
89
110
50

31
45
68
87
108
48

42
55
77
96
116
50

54
63
85
85
106
45

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology.
Notes: The denominator is married man in same educational category. For ratios with ownannuity, this applies to men and women. For ratios with public benefit, this also applies to
men and women. See text for methodology and see Table 4-1a for educational categories.
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Annuity+public benefit, full career/10-year woman, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina
450%
Mexico
Chile
Argentina

400%

FC as % of 10-yr

350%
300%
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%

1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

Figure 4-6. Full-career woman gets lower payoff for extra work (relative to 10-year
women) in Argentina than in Mexico or Chile.

Results: Gender Ratios under the New and Old Systems
We now compare the ratios of lifetime benefits under the old and new
systems for men and women with the same education. We find that
(a) female/male ratios generally fall postreform when only the ownannuity is taken into account; (b) in Argentina and Mexico they rise modestly postreform when both the public and private benefits are included
(this is the situation for single women with average work histories); (c ) in all
three countries gender ratios are much higher when benefits from the joint
annuity are added and, of course, they are higher for full-career women; so
(d) this brings the postreform relative position of average married women
and full-career women, whether married or single, above that in the old
system. These changes after the reform are due to the targeting of transfers
to low earners, the fact that women do not have to give up their own
pensions to receive the widow’s benefit, and the heavier weight placed by
the new system on early contributions due to compound interest (Table
4-5). For example, in Argentina the female/male ratio of lifetime pension
for a single woman with an average work history and a secondary school
education is projected to rise from 42 percent based on her own pension
in the new system, to 44 percent including the flat benefit, to 72 percent
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if she marries, and to 112 percent if she works full career, compared with
33, 47, and 55 percent, respectively, for her single, average, married, and
full-career married counterparts in the old system.

Which Subgroups Benefited (or Lost) the Most?
To further analyze which subgroups benefited the most from the reform,
we calculate the ratio of postreform/pre-reform lifetime benefits for various marital, educational, and labor market groups. As noted above, we
focus on relative changes because we do not know what the absolute benefit
would have been under the counterfactual. Additionally, we wish to see how
the relative positions of different subgroups of men changed. Therefore,
instead of comparing women with men of the same education, we analyze
the postreform changes for subgroups of each gender, relative to changes
for married men in the top education category. That is, we calculate the
postreform/pre-reform ratio for each subgroup and then divide (normalize) by the ratio for married male workers in the top educational group
(see Table 4-6 and Figures 4-7a, 4-7b, and 4-7c). A ratio above 100 percent
indicates that the given subgroup has gained more (or lost less) than did
married males with the highest education. As expected, the biggest relative
gainers were:

r low earners (as proxied by low educational category) of both genders,
but especially women, who are the lowest earners in each category and
therefore benefit disproportionately from the public benefit;
r married women (in Chile and Argentina)—because they can now keep
their own annuity plus the joint annuity, whereas previously they had
to give up one or the other;
r full-career women (in Chile and Mexico)—because they gain most
from the actuarially fair private annuity; and
r single men—because they no longer have to subsidize the widow’s
benefit that was financed from the common pool in the old systems.
In all three countries, workers in the two lowest educational groups gain
relative to those in the two highest groups. Married women and single men
generally gain relative to married men. In Chile and Argentina, married
women gain more than do single women (but vice versa in Mexico, because
of the generous widow’s benefit in the old system). In Chile and Mexico,
full-career women gain the most from the reform—and over time this may
induce more women to participate in the labor market full career. In Chile,
the relative position of ten-year women actually falls. In Argentina, however,
average and ten-year women register the largest relative gains because of
that country’s flat benefit for retirees with only ten years of work.
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Table 4-6 Expected Present Values of Postreform/Pre-reform Lifetime Benefits
(in Percentages) (Relative to Ratio for Married Men in Top
Educational Group) (r = 5% during Accumulation, 3.5% during
Annuity Stage, Real Wage Growth = 2%)
Education
Chile
Average man
Married man
Single man
Women
Average woman: own + MPG
Average woman: own + MPG + joint
Full-career woman: own-annuity
Full-career woman: own + joint annuity
10-year woman: own + joint annuity
Argentina
Average man
Married man
Single man
Women
Average woman: own annuity + flat
Average woman: own + flat + joint
Full-career woman: own + flat
Full-career woman: own + flat + joint
10 year woman: own+flat+joint
Mexico
Average man
Married man
Single man
Women
Average woman: own incl. SQ
Average woman: own incl. SQ + joint
Full-career woman: own incl. SQ
Full-career woman: own + SQ + joint
10-year woman: own incl. SQ + joint

1

2

3

4

5

123
148

117
141

117
142

94
114

100
121

99
136
133
168
85

92
128
134
172
98

69
97
112
141
99

67
89
122
154
77

74
105
94
128
91

188
219

130
154

94
112

111
132

100
121

373
325
228
278
294

366
281
216
251
252

128
144
167
188
186

114
143
140
178
204

112
137
123
155
173

181
219

150
181

122
147

89
107

100
120

199
154
225
180
134

195
138
221
166
130

187
122
169
130
114

146
96
116
92
95

108
88
94
82
103

Source: Calculations by authors. See text and James, Edwards, and Wong (2008) for fuller
discussion of data and methodology.
Notes: Includes lifetime benefits from own-annuity, public pillar, and joint annuity (for
married). Each cell i shows (PVnew/PVold)i/(PVnew/PVold)k where (PVnew/PVold) =
ratio of the present value of lifetime benefits in the new versus old systems for group i.
This is normalized by the ratio for reference group k, where k = married men in the
highest educational category. If the number in a cell is >100%, this means the category
gained more than top married men. For educational categories see Table 4-1a, and for
methodology see text.
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Postreform/prereform ratios of EPV, by subgroup (normalized by ratio of top ed. man), Chile
Full-career m. woman
Single Man
FC single

200%
180%

Average m. woman
Ten-year m. woman
Average single woman

Post/prereform ratios (normalized)

160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1

2

3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to 5+ postsecondary)

Figure 4-7a. Low-earning full-career married women and single men are biggest
relative gainers from the reform in Chile. Note: EPV = expected present value.

Single Women
Given the importance of the joint annuity, how do single women fare?
This question is important because an increasing proportion of women
are divorced or never married. Divorce became legal in Chile in 2004, and
the proportion of divorced women doubled in Mexico over the past three
decades. Cohabitation is not uncommon among low-educated groups in
Latin America, and many children are born out of wedlock to parents in
informal arrangements. Single women are a heterogeneous group, including those who were divorced, widowed, and never married, whose behavior
may vary. Construction of synthetic work histories of single women, broken down into subgroups when possible, indicates that full-career women
without joint annuity or widow’s benefit are a reasonably good proxy for
never-married women (James, Edwards, and Wong, 2008).
In the new systems in all three countries, lifetime pensions of full-career
single women are lower than those of men, because of their smaller wages
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Postreform/prereform ratios of EPV, by subgroup, Argentina
(normalized by ratio of top ed. man)

Post/prereform EPV ratios (normalized)

350%
Av. m. women
Ten-year m. woman
FC m. woman.
FC single woman
Single man

300%
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200%
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3

4

5

Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary+)

Figure 4-7b. Low-earning average and 10-year married women gained most of all
(Argentina). Note: EPV = expected present value.

and greater longevity, or of full-career married women, because they do
not get the joint annuity. In Argentina and Mexico, the pension income
of single full-career women rises postreform compared to single or married men, because of the relatively generous public benefit that flattens
total benefits. In contrast, in Chile, where they are unlikely to collect an
equalizing public benefit, their position falls relative to single men but
rises relative to married men (Table 4-6 and Figures 4-7a, 4-7b, and 4-7c).
Concerns about the situation of single women could be addressed through
measures such as (a) the use of unisex mortality tables in pricing annuities
(redistributing from men in general to women in general), (b) partial wageindexation of public benefits for the very old (redistributing to those who
live longer), or (c ) equalization of women’s retirement age with that of
men (requiring them to work as long as men to raise their old-age consumption). Basically, the pensions of single women are likely to approach
those of men only when their wages and work experience approach those of
men.
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Postreform/prereform ratios of EPV, by subgroup, Mexico
(normalized by ratio of top ed. man)

Post/prereform ratios (normalized)

2.5
FC single woman
Single man
FC married woman
Average married woman
Ten-year m. woman

2

1.5

1

0.5

0
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Education (incomplete primary to postsecondary)

Figure 4-7c. Low-earning FC single women and single men are biggest relative
gainers from the reform in Mexico. Note: EPV = expected present value.

Implications for Social Security Reform
in Other Countries
To sum up, the empirical investigations show that (a) women’s ownannuities are lower than those of men in multipillar pension schemes, as
they would be in any scheme tying benefits closely to contributions; but (b)
women are recipients of net public transfers and private intrahousehold
transfers through joint pensions required in the new systems. Consequently,
(c ) women have gained more than men from the reforms; the lifetime
gender ratio has improved (these ratios would improve still more if the
retirement age for men and women were equalized). Finally, (d) work
incentives are stronger in Chile and Mexico, where full-career women
gain the most, while Argentina affords greater protection for women with
limited labor market participation.
Individual account systems can improve relative outcomes for women
and have done so in Latin America. However, the gains to women are

17:39

04-Kay-and-Sinha-c04

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

(Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 124 of 133

August 20, 2007

124 Estelle James, Alejandra Cox Edwards, and Rebeca Wong

not inevitable. The gender impact largely depends on the detailed design
features of these reforms. The favorable outcomes we have described for
Latin-American women contrast with those in the transition economies
of Eastern and Central Europe, where preliminary investigations suggest
that women lost relative to men because of the removal of privileges they
had in the old system, maintenance of an earlier retirement age, absence
of a targeted public pillar, the weakening of survivor’s benefits, and the
failure to require joint annuities (Castel and Fox 2001; Woycicka 2001). In
Sweden, too, women’s position deteriorated for many of the same reasons
(Stahlberg, Kruse, and Sunden 2006a, 2006b). Other countries contemplating such reforms, and countries trying to improve traditional DB systems,
can draw a number of lessons on how to improve gender outcomes.
1. A safety net and minimum pension are especially important for women.
Because of women’s lower lifetime earnings, a redistributive public benefit
is particularly important. Chile’s MPG, Mexico’s SQ, and Argentina’s flat
benefit are projected to improve women’s lifetime pensions substantially,
narrowing the gender gap. Two dangers are (a) rules that largely exclude
women (such as Mexico’s twenty-four-year requirement for the MPG), and
(b) rules that discourage their participation in the formal labor market
(such as the high marginal tax rate for low earners who have just met the
twenty-year eligibility rule in Chile). The MPG and Argentina’s flat benefit could be redesigned to increase with years worked, thereby providing
positive work incentives. Mexico’s SQ already does this.
2. The public benefit should be at least partially wage-indexed for successive
cohorts. It is essential that the public benefit rise at least as fast as prices
so its purchasing power does not fall over the lifetime of the retiree, a
trend particularly harmful to women, who live longer than men. Most
reformed Latin-American systems price-index the public benefit. However,
price-indexing may not be enough to equalize benefits for men and women
in the long run. The simulations for Chile showed that as wages grow,
a price-indexed MPG would set a floor for very old women and future
cohorts far below the pensions of men and the average standard of living.
In practice, Chile’s MPG has increased with wages and is likely to keep
women’s retirement income rising on par with the average standard of
living. A wage-indexed MPG is costlier, however, and produces larger work
disincentives. The Swiss system uses a compromise: it indexes its benefit half
to wages and half to prices. Policymakers and citizens will have to evaluate
this tradeoff between saving money versus maintaining the relevance of the
safety net over time.14
3. Annuitization and inflation insurance for annuities are important for women.
Annuitization, which provides a guaranteed income for life, is especially
important for women in view of their greater longevity. Although it is
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automatically achieved by a DB system, it could also be built into an
individual account system. Latin-American workers can either purchase an
annuity or take gradual withdrawals; lump-sum withdrawals are not allowed
unless the person’s pension exceeds a high threshold. However, if the
person lives longer than expected, the gradual withdrawal may become very
small as voluntary savings are used up. This problem can be prevented by
mandatory annuitization, at least up to a threshold well above the poverty
line.
Inflation insurance is important for the income from the individual
account, just as for the public benefit. In Latin America, during the accumulation stage account, balances grow with the rate of interest, which is
generally greater than the inflation rate. During the payout stage, annuities
in Chile are price-indexed; Mexico plans to do the same. Chile facilitates
price-indexing by the prevalence of indexed bonds and other financial
instruments in which insurance companies can invest. The paucity of
indexed instruments in many other countries will make price-indexing
more difficult and costly.
4. Joint pensions should be required in the payout stage. Women often work
fewer years as part of an informal family contract in which the husband
agrees to support the wife in exchange for the time she spends caring
for the family. In Latin America this contract is enforced even after the
husband’s death by requiring that all workers purchase survivor’s insurance before retirement and joint pensions on retirement15 —an important
requirement to build into any individual account system. In contrast, when
spousal and widow’s benefits are financed from the common pool, as in DB
systems, single men and women are penalized, since they must pay into the
pool even though they are not eligible for this benefit.16 An added bonus of
joint annuities is that they defuse the contentious unisex issue; in the case
of joint annuities, payouts for men and women are largely invariant to the
choice of unisex versus gender-specific tables. The systems we are analyzing
do not contain detailed mechanisms for how to handle accumulations
and joint annuities in the case of divorce. These rights clearly need to be
defined, with account-splitting a logical solution when marriages dissolve.
5. Widow’s benefits should not penalize working women. The treatment of
widow’s benefits in DB systems often penalizes working women. In the old
Chilean and Argentine schemes, and in many other countries, working
women must choose between their own or the widow’s benefit—they cannot get both. Thus, women who work in the market for much of their lives
pay substantial taxes with little or no incremental benefit. On the contrary,
in the new Latin-American systems the widow keeps both her own and the
joint annuity, because her husband has financed the latter. Market work
by the wife is rewarded and widows are protected, without imposing an
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additional burden on the public treasury. Women’s right to keep their ownannuity in addition to the joint annuity is a major reason for the narrowed
gender gap in the new systems.
6. Equalizing retirement ages for men and women and providing work incentives
will substantially narrow the gender gap. Part of the reason for the lower ownannuities of women in Chile and Argentina is that women’s retirement
age is five years earlier than men’s retirement age—also common in other
countries. Under reasonable assumptions about rates of return, women’s
annuities would go up by 50 percent if they retired five years later (they
earn interest in the meantime and the annuity covers fewer years). This
scenario would substantially narrow the gender gap in pensions without
requiring public or household transfers and would ensure that lifetime
retirement savings are allocated to old age instead of young old age. This
is especially important for single women, who will not receive a boost to
their incomes from the joint annuity. The postponed access to retirement
saving may encourage additional work by older women, and will therefore
increase the country’s productive capacity. For the same reason, as noted
above, it is important to build work incentives into the public benefit, both
in traditional and in new multipillar systems.17
7. Which women should benefit from redistributions? Among low earners, each
country must decide whether it wishes to target those who have chosen
to work fewer years versus those whose productive capacity is low so they
can only earn low wage rates. Many countries are very conflicted on this
issue. As we have seen, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico have made different
decisions about which groups of women should be subsidized and, in doing
so, are encouraging different behaviors. In particular, their rewards for
women who engage in market versus home work differ.
Mexico’s SQ is a flat payment per day worked, so is strongly promarket
work. It redistributes most to those who work a lot in the market, although
at low wage rates. Argentina, on the other hand, subsidizes women who
stay at home with a flat benefit that they receive so long as they participated
in the labor market for ten years. This redistribution gives older women
a subsidized income even if they had the educational capacity to work
and earn high wages but chose not to do so. Chile is ambivalent on this
issue. Its MPG redistributes to women with low earnings—but only if they
have worked in the market for at least twenty years. Other countries solve
this problem by treating years spent caring for children as part of working
time. Along similar lines, husbands could be required to contribute to the
individual accounts of their spouses who work in the home, through the
income tax system. This would reduce the need for a public subsidy.
It may be interesting to see how the current US system compares with
Latin America in its choice between subsidizing low wages versus low work,
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homework versus market work. In the USA, a higher rate of return is
provided to those with low lifetime earnings, providing they have worked
for at least ten years. (This tends to be offset by above-average mortality
among low earners.) The US formula does not distinguish between people
who have worked a little at high wage rates and those who have worked a
lot at low rates. Studies have shown that often low earnings result from low
years of work rather than low wage rates (Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass
1999, 2000; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000).

Caveats and Gaps
This chapter has identified a number of issues and gaps that have yet to be
addressed, such as price versus wage indexation of the public benefit, the
retirement age differential between men and women, and the retirement
income problem faced by single women, divorced women, and women
cohabiting without formal marriage. On a more fundamental level, this
chapter has dealt with women who are in or who have husbands in the
formal labor market and the contributory social security system. It does not
address the large group of rural women in low-income countries who do
not meet these criteria and who may have little income or savings when
they become old. If the family system does not work for these women,
a noncontributory program of some sort is needed to keep them out of
poverty. How such a program should be structured and how it relates to
the contributory scheme is a complex topic that goes beyond the purview
of this chapter.
Every system works in practice somewhat differently from what was initially written on paper, partly due to unexpected circumstances that require
system modification and partly due to behavioral responses to system incentives. This outcome was very true of the Latin-American systems in the past
and will certainly be true of the new systems. For example, it is well known
that the labor force participation rates of women are increasing, so younger
female cohorts will have higher relative pensions than older cohorts. The
new systems themselves may accelerate this process. The Argentine reform
has already been modified several times and is likely to be modified again
in the coming years as economic conditions change. Similarly, the political decision to raise the MPG in Chile on par with wages rather than
prices means that it is much more pervasive than was initially envisaged.
Finally, recent research has found that most workers retire earlier than the
‘normal’ age and contribute to the system for only part of their working
lives (Berstein, Larrain, and Pino 2005; Edwards and James 2005; James,
Martinez, and Iglesias 2006). This directly reduces their accumulations,
pensions, and eligibility for the public benefit.
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Each of these changes is likely to alter the gender gap in pensions as
well as the redistributive and equalizing role of public benefits. We cannot
really know how the system has worked, as distinct from how it is projected
to work, until after many workers have retired and data on their behavior
and incomes become available. In the meantime, we can examine how the
systems that were put in place originally would work and, most important,
which design features produce these results. These positive findings will in
turn teach us how to create newer systems that are most likely to give us the
gender effects that we normatively prefer.

Notes
1

In the USA, 60% of people older than 65 years and 72% of those older than
85 years are women, and this disparity has increased over time. The poverty rate
of women older than 65 years is 15%, compared with 7% for men older than 65
years. The poverty rate for women older than 85 years is 20%, and for divorced,
separated, or never-married elderly women, it is 27% (see Shirley and Spiegler
1998; Street and Wilmoth 2001). Poverty rates for the elderly are more difficult
to measure in developing countries, where older people are likely to live with their
grown-up children in extended family arrangements. Moreover, we do not know
how the total consumption of the household is distributed.
2
For similar reasons, women are likely to serve as caregivers for their husbands,
but then outlive their spouses and need formal caregivers themselves. Thus, costs
of provisions for long-term care are especially important for women. However, this
issue goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
3
In all three countries fees as percentage of assets were higher initially than they
are now due to fixed costs and rising assets. Lower fees produce higher pensions
but leave gender ratios unchanged, since both men and women are charged the
same proportion of their contributions or assets.
4
In Argentina the new system has been under re-examination because of the
fiscal crisis and political pressures to increase benefits. The contribution rate, for
example, has been temporarily reduced and a new minimum pension that is about
45% of the average taxable wage has been introduced. Moreover, individuals are
now permitted to claim credits for periods of self-employment on their date of
retirement, simply in exchange for taking a 20% reduction in benefits in lieu of
prior contributions. About half of all current retirees receive the minimum benefit
(personal communication with Rafael Rofman, World Bank, April 2005). Women
are recipients disproportionately (but note that most of these pensions are based
on the old system, since the new system has been in effect only for ten years). The
old system also changed frequently, was not always implemented as written, and
several regimes coexisted. We base our analysis and discussion on the new system
that was put in place in 1994 and the old system as written, for the main regime,
shortly before the reform.
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5
Actually, the worker can choose to apply this contribution toward a public DB or
a private DC plan similar to the Chilean model. As of 2001, over 80% of all affiliates
were in the private DC rather than the public DB, which is why this chapter focuses
on the private DC option.
6
INFONAVIT historically provided a negative real return, but the hope of the
reformers was that this would eventually change. In our simulations we assume a 0
real return.
7
The Chile estimates are based on CASEN 94, a nationally representative household survey. Our estimates are based on the urban sample—approximately 100,000
individuals aged 16 years or older. The Argentine data are based on the microdata
set of the Encuesta Nacional de Gastos de los Hogares (ENGH) for 1996–7, a
nationally representative household survey from urban areas. The sample contains
103,858 individuals, of whom 69,895 were aged 16 years or older. The Mexican data
come from the 1997 Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE-97) completed
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI), or the
Mexican Statistical Bureau. The sample contains information on 119,405 individuals aged 12 years or older. We use the subsample corresponding to more urban
areas (communities of 100,000 people or more), which is about 78% of the sample.
For more details on data-sets, potential data problems, and construction of tables,
see James, Edwards, and Wong (2003a, 2003b, and 2008.)
8
In the USA and Europe, where portfolio choice might be greater, it has sometimes been argued that women are more conservative investors than men—e.g. see
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Bajtelsmit, Bernasek, and Jianakoplos (1999),
Bernasek and Shwiff (2001). For surveys of this literature, see US GAO (1997) and
Burnes and Schulz (2000). The restrictions on portfolios in Latin America during
the period of our study preclude this possibility. However, in 2002 Chile introduced
portfolio choice, and other countries are following suit, so the problem may also
arise in Latin America.
9
Our analysis concentrates throughout on the benefit rather than the cost side.
We do not know the future cost of the public pillar, its intergenerational burden,
or its gender incidence, either in the old or new systems. Net redistributions from
public benefits (transfers received minus taxes implicitly paid to finance them) are
discussed in James, Edwards, and Wong (2003a, 2003b, and 2008), based on the
simplifying assumptions that each cohort covers its own bill and, within each cohort,
the tax burden is distributed proportionally to earnings, as proxied by the present
value of lifetime own-annuities.
10
Labor informality in Latin America leads many workers, especially women, to
contribute for less than half of their adult lives, so they fail to meet the twenty-year
requirement. Chile also offers a noncontributory social assistance program called
pensiones asistenciales, or PASIS, funded out of general revenues, which pays about
50% of the MPG. PASIS is designed to keep out of poverty those elderly not eligible
for contributory benefits. The vast majority of its recipients are women living in
rural areas.
11
Many men, however, do not contribute when they work, leading to the problem
of low density of contributions. The government apparently is unable to enforce the
contribution requirement effectively. Consequently, retirees will have low pensions
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and may demand that the government bail them out. How to handle this problem
is a pressing issue today in most Latin-American countries.
12
Several subsystems coexisted in Chile and Argentina, but a common formula
paid 50% of pensionable salary for the first 10 years of work plus 1% per year
thereafter. In Mexico, the old system paid a proportion of the base salary for the
first ten years plus an increment for every year over ten. The proportion of the base
varied negatively with wages, ranging from 13% for high earners to 80% for low
earners. The increment for additional years varied positively with wages, ranging
from 0.56 to 2.45% per year (see James, Edwards, and Wong 2003a, 2003b, and
2008 for details).
13
Note that the old systems sometimes indexed the minimum benefits for inflation
but did not index higher benefits. In this case, many people received the minimum
pension during inflationary periods. This produced high gender ratios but at very
low absolute pension levels.
14
The US social security system now price-indexes the benefit once the individual
has retired, but wage-indexes the first pension received so that successive cohorts
start out with pensions that have gone up with wage growth. Some policymakers
have proposed full price indexation, so that the real benefit will be frozen in today’s
value. Critics point out that this will lead the benefit to eventually become much
smaller relative to the average wage and the average standard of living in society.
One compromise would wage-index for the bottom half while price-indexing for
the upper half (progressive indexation), which would lead eventually to a flat
benefit. Another compromise would index the entire public benefit half to wages
and half to prices, as in Switzerland (or to longevity increases, which is roughly
equivalent).
15
In Chile wives do not have to purchase joint pensions to cover their husbands.
16
In the USA, a spouse older than 65 years receives 50% of her husband’s benefit,
even if she has not worked and contributed. After he dies she gets 100% of his
benefit, which means that married couples receive larger benefits than (and are
subsidized by) singles with the same total earnings, and couples with one wageearner get larger benefits than (and are subsidized by) couples in which both
husband and wife work, with the same total earnings. Furthermore, the nonworking
wife in a single-earner family gets a larger benefit than the wife in a dual-earner
family with the same total family income. For examples, see Shirley and Spiegler
(1998).
17
This could also be built into traditional DB systems by reducing the benefits of
husbands on an actuarially fair basis to finance the survivor’s benefits of their wives.
Widows could then keep their own benefit in addition to the survivor’s benefit,
thereby improving their own as well as the treasury’s well-being.
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